As so often happens in the field of constitutional law, events converge that serve to illustrate how real-world practice often departs from constitutional principle. The same-day announcements on May 26 by President Obama of Sonya Sotomayor as his choice for the U.S. Supreme Court and by the California Supreme Court of its decision to uphold Proposition 8 is but another such serendipitous pairing.
First, constitutional principle suggests that President Obama owed the nation a strong nominee - and with Sonya Sotomayor, he delivered.
Those who framed the Constitution knew that it would take a special kind of person to guarantee equal justice to all - including the less powerful - even when majorities in the legislative and executive branches would not. “It is easy to see,” Alexander Hamilton wrote, “that it would require an uncommon portion of fortitude in the judges to do their duty as faithful guardians of the Constitution, where legislative invasions of it had been instigated by the major voice in the community.”
Sonya Sotomayor understands the constitutional role of judges. As she commented in 1997, “I believe we should not bend the Constitution under any circumstances. It says what it says. We should honor it.” A strong judge like Judge Sotomayor knows that when majorities abridge the rights of individuals, it is the judge’s sometimes unpopular role to overcome the majority’s will.
Weak judges, by contrast, hide behind majority opinion to avoid protecting individual liberty and equality. The California Supreme Court’s decision Tuesday to uphold Proposition 8 (despite holding just last year that discrimination against gays is no less unconstitutional than discrimination based on race or religion) is an example of judging that is, well, weak.
As the lone strong voice, dissenting Justice Carlos J. Moreno, put it, “The rule the majority crafts today … weakens the status of our state Constitution as a bulwark of fundamental rights for minorities protected from the will of the majority.”
Exactly right.
These principles apply to the federal Constitution as well. The framers believed that the whole point of majoritarian government is to protect liberty and equality for all. As James Madison explained in arguing for the Bill of Rights before the First Congress, “independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the legislative or executive.” And Hamilton commented that “the interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts…. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable difference between [the Constitution and a legislative act]…, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.”
In concept, the principle of judicial review is one upon which liberals and conservatives can agree. At his confirmation hearings in 2005, for example, Chief Justice John Roberts commented, “I don't think the Court should be a taskmaster of Congress. The Constitution is the Court's taskmaster, and it is Congress's as well.” Neither federal, state nor local majorities, in other words, may pass laws (including amendments to state constitutions) that abridge rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution - and it is the judge’s responsibility to make sure that they do not.
Viewed in this light, the “judicial activist” warhorse regularly trotted out by those opposed to judges doing their jobs to protect the rights of minorities (usually under the guise that such action constitutes inappropriate “legislating from the bench”) is exposed for what it is: a tired old nag ready for the glue factory.
Showing posts with label judicial review. Show all posts
Showing posts with label judicial review. Show all posts
Sunday, June 14, 2009
Strong versus Weak Judging
Thursday, May 28, 2009
Reconciling Liberty and Progressive Government
Following is a paper I am presenting this week at the Law & Society Conference in Denver, "Reconciling Liberty and Progressive Government," that synthesizes a number my prior postings:
Libertarians with progressive sympathies (or progressives with libertarian sympathies) are confronted by a nagging conundrum: that individual freedom and the common-good, almost by definition, can seem to be mutually exclusive. If we indiscriminately elevate individual free-will, we risk tragedy-of-the-commons issues; by contrast, if we indiscriminately enact progressive legislation for the common good, we run the risk of inflicting death by a thousand cuts on individual liberty.
A concept we may call "Progressive Liberty" is an attempt to reconcile the seemingly contradictory concepts of individual liberty and the common-good. Looking first at the “liberty” half of the phrase, America was founded, first and foremost, to preserve individual freedom from oppressive government. This part is nonnegotiable. America's founding documents - the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution - make the point clearly: the single irreducible value eclipsing all else under the American constitutional regime is liberty. The eminent historian Eric Foner explains, “No idea is more fundamental to Americans’ sense of themselves as individuals and as a nation than “freedom” … or “liberty,” The Declaration of Independence lists liberty among mankind’s inalienable rights; the Constitution announces as its purpose to secure liberty’s blessings…”
Historian Bernard Bailyn reports that the most basic goals of the American Revolution were to “free the individual from the oppressive misuse of power, [and] from the tyranny of the state.” To conceptualize, imagine if you will the “Google-Earth” feature of Google; except here, written answers to basic constitutional questions may be viewed in greater or lesser detail by zooming-in or zooming-out. Zooming-out to view the question, “What single value does the Constitution stand for?,” from the widest possible angle, where all detail has been lost leaving only one answer to the question, the answer would read, “Liberty.” Zooming-in, we could next read, “Equality,” “Democracy,” then “Property,” and so on. These more detailed values are simply means to the ultimate end – which is liberty.
What to do when government intrudes upon liberty? The framers of the Constitution envisioned that the judiciary would play a key role in protecting liberty from majoritarian excess. James Madison, arguing in support of passage of the Bill of Rights before the First Congress, said, “independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the legislative or executive.” Addressing a French correspondent, Thomas Jefferson wrote, “the laws of the land, administered by upright judges, … would protect you from any exercise of power unauthorized by the Constitution of the United States.” And in Federalist 78 Alexander Hamilton commented that “the interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts…. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable difference between [the Constitution and a legislative act]…, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.”
This is something upon which judges and scholars from across the political spectrum can agree. Conservative icon Robert Bork, for example, has written that “there are some things a majority should not do to us no matter how democratically it decides to do them. These are areas properly left to individual freedom…. Society consents to be ruled undemocratically within defined areas by certain enduring principles believed to be stated in, and placed beyond the reach of majorities by, the Constitution.”
In practice, however, conservative ideology has latched onto the idea that the use of judicial review is “undemocratic” and “activist”; and will almost always constitute inappropriate “legislating from the bench.” What this argument ignores, of course, is that the whole point of the Constitution’s scheme of majoritarian government in the first place is to protect liberty and equal justice. As explained by Madison, Jefferson and Hamilton, the true original intent of the framers was that constitutionally-protected liberty and equal justice are not to be sacrificed to majority will.
When the Court fails to properly exercise its power of judicial review, liberty and equal justice suffer, because there is simply no other institution left to protect individual and minority rights. During World War I, for example, the Court upheld vast legislative prohibitions on speech; and during World War II it refused to curb executive forced-relocation and internment of thousands of innocent Japanese-Americans. America would look quite different today if the Court – largely under the leadership of Chief Justice Earl Warren, whose strong support of judicial review prompted President Dwight Eisenhower to grumble that his 1953 appointment of Warren to the Court was “the biggest damn-fool mistake I ever made” - had not eventually returned to checking the unconstitutional excesses of the democratically-elected executive and legislative branches.
As for the other part of the progressive liberty equation, how are we to understand how progressive government may proceed in acting for the common good? The first thing to understand is that, as compared to non-negotiable liberty, the “progressive” part of progressive liberty IS negotiable. In a democratic republic, it is the will of the people what sort of society they will have. So long as the government is not infringing on individual freedom, it can set widely varying policy - anything from a minimalist caretaker state to a more progressive social welfare model of the sort seen in Western Europe (or indeed, something more different still than either of these).
An energetic position, one that a progressive libertarian would favor, suggests that it is the government's duty to enact humane policy that looks out for people who can't help themselves, and that provides equal opportunity to all. Among other things, this means that government should guarantee that every man, woman, and child have access to basic healthcare. (Incidentally, the framers appeared to be “progressives” of a sort themselves, in that they advocated an energetic government. “Energy in the [government] is a leading character in the definition of good government,” Hamilton wrote in the Federalist 70. Madison agreed. “Energy in government,” he said in No. 37, “is essential to that security against external and internal danger, and to that prompt and salutary execution of the laws, which enter into the very definition of good government.”)
Does this mean that the Constitution mandates such government involvement?In a word: No. The Constitution sets up the republican form of the government and imposes strict limits on governmental infringements of individual liberty; but it leaves the details of social and economic policy to be worked out by the people through the democratic process. Whether the people prefer a Progressive Society, a Minimalist Society, or some other sort of Society, they control their destiny by voting for representatives who will legislate to that end. That's republican democracy: accountable majorities enacting policy; and if the majorities don't adequately reflect the people's wishes, others are elected who will. Then if at any time the democratically-accountable majority legislates in ways that inappropriately infringe individual liberty, the Constitution (as enforced by the Court) steps in. That's what liberty is about - limited government constrained by a Constitution that protects, above all else, individual freedom.
. . .
Now that we have a definition for progressive liberty, let’s look closer at the title of this paper, “Reconciling Liberty and Progressive Government.” Specifically, how are we to know the threshold beyond which a progressive, energetic government may not go, lest it infringe upon constitutionally-protected liberty?
An excellent place to start (and perhaps end) is with the "harm principle" enunciated by J.S. Mill in his 1859 classic, On Liberty:
"[There is but] one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, … that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others…. The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign."
Putting this into practical terms that government policymakers can apply, we might “think of the harm principle as operating in two steps,” Professor Ian Shapiro suggests. “When evaluating a particular action or policy, the first step involves deciding whether the action causes, or has the potential to cause, harm to others. If the answer is no, then the action is in the self-regarding realm and the government would be unjustified in interfering. Indeed, in that case the government has a duty to protect the individual’s freedom of action against interference from others as well. [The second step occurs] if, however, the answer to the initial query is yes, [in which case] different considerations arise. We are then in a world in which harm is being committed willy-nilly, and the question is: What, if anything, should the government do about it?,” and it is up to the democratic process to work that out.
In other words, society may legislate – whether progressively or not – either when the legislation (a) simply does not affect individual liberty, and/or (b) when a person’s conduct in exercising individual liberty prejudicially affects, or harms, the interests of others. (Incidentally, some, such as Randy Barnett, would define this latter situation as not involving “liberty” at all, but rather as “license” (which is not protected by the Constitution); on the reasoning that liberty, by definition, cannot harm others). In either case it is open to discussion through the democratic process whether the common good will be promoted. So conceived, the society may strike a balance between liberty and progressive government.
It is important to re-emphasize Shapiro’s conclusion, however (perhaps to the point of tedium), that according to the Harm Principle, “short of the point at which a person's conduct affects the interests of no persons besides himself, there is no room for [memorializing into law any such policy discussion.]” Individual liberty prevails in such cases, not to be touched by government.
This last point is crucial, in light of government's unceasing, inexorable, and perhaps-inevitable tendency to interfere inappropriately in individual conduct. Alexis de Tocqueville presciently identified the danger of an overactive government in his 1830 masterpiece, Democracy in America, stating: “[In a maturing democracy,] a wholly new species of oppression will arise. Among citizens equal and alike, the supreme power, the democratic government, acting in response to the will of the majority, will create a society with a network of small complicated rules, minute and uniform, that none can escape. Ultimately, then, the citizens of a democratic country will be reduced to nothing better than a flock of timid and industrious animals, of which the government is the shepherd.” To some in America today, this scenario sounds uncomfortably familiar.
Once again, under our constitutional regime it is the role of the judiciary to prevent this sort of creeping tyranny from occurring. One difficulty, though, is that ever since 1937 the Supreme Court has applied a disproportionately deferential standard of review to government action - to the detriment of individual liberty. (This occurred largely as a backlash to the Supreme Court overstepping its bounds during the mid-1930s when it aggressively struck down FDR’s New Deal legislation. Throughout the rest of the 20th and into the 21st century, the Court has swung too far in the other direction by not going far enough in requiring government (particularly state and local government) to justify its actions that may potentially affect liberty interests.) A more deferential-to-liberty standard of judicial review is needed, perhaps modeled on the Court’s existing First Amendment “reasonable time, place and manner” doctrine, as I suggest in a 2007 Louisiana Law Review piece. This approach, already championed on a narrow basis by the Third Circuit Federal Court of Appeals in Lutz v. York in 1990, more accurately honors the Constitution’s core Liberty-first ideals, while also recognizing the proper constitutional role of government in maintaining law and order.
In conclusion, government is liberty’s servant in America. Government – and democracy itself - exists primarily to protect liberty, with the Constitution serving as the bulwark against inevitable government attempts toward overreaching. The framers understood that men are not angels and that power has the overwhelming tendency to corrupt, so they constructed a limited government of separated powers with the ultimate power reserved to the people to operate within their own self-imposed constitutional constraints.
That said, to the extent government action does not implicate liberty, the details of social and economic policy are to be worked out by the people through the democratic process. One can be a staunch supporter of liberty on one hand; while working actively through the democratic process to enact progressive, energetic policy. That, in essence, is progressive liberty.
Libertarians with progressive sympathies (or progressives with libertarian sympathies) are confronted by a nagging conundrum: that individual freedom and the common-good, almost by definition, can seem to be mutually exclusive. If we indiscriminately elevate individual free-will, we risk tragedy-of-the-commons issues; by contrast, if we indiscriminately enact progressive legislation for the common good, we run the risk of inflicting death by a thousand cuts on individual liberty.
A concept we may call "Progressive Liberty" is an attempt to reconcile the seemingly contradictory concepts of individual liberty and the common-good. Looking first at the “liberty” half of the phrase, America was founded, first and foremost, to preserve individual freedom from oppressive government. This part is nonnegotiable. America's founding documents - the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution - make the point clearly: the single irreducible value eclipsing all else under the American constitutional regime is liberty. The eminent historian Eric Foner explains, “No idea is more fundamental to Americans’ sense of themselves as individuals and as a nation than “freedom” … or “liberty,” The Declaration of Independence lists liberty among mankind’s inalienable rights; the Constitution announces as its purpose to secure liberty’s blessings…”
Historian Bernard Bailyn reports that the most basic goals of the American Revolution were to “free the individual from the oppressive misuse of power, [and] from the tyranny of the state.” To conceptualize, imagine if you will the “Google-Earth” feature of Google; except here, written answers to basic constitutional questions may be viewed in greater or lesser detail by zooming-in or zooming-out. Zooming-out to view the question, “What single value does the Constitution stand for?,” from the widest possible angle, where all detail has been lost leaving only one answer to the question, the answer would read, “Liberty.” Zooming-in, we could next read, “Equality,” “Democracy,” then “Property,” and so on. These more detailed values are simply means to the ultimate end – which is liberty.
What to do when government intrudes upon liberty? The framers of the Constitution envisioned that the judiciary would play a key role in protecting liberty from majoritarian excess. James Madison, arguing in support of passage of the Bill of Rights before the First Congress, said, “independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the legislative or executive.” Addressing a French correspondent, Thomas Jefferson wrote, “the laws of the land, administered by upright judges, … would protect you from any exercise of power unauthorized by the Constitution of the United States.” And in Federalist 78 Alexander Hamilton commented that “the interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts…. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable difference between [the Constitution and a legislative act]…, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.”
This is something upon which judges and scholars from across the political spectrum can agree. Conservative icon Robert Bork, for example, has written that “there are some things a majority should not do to us no matter how democratically it decides to do them. These are areas properly left to individual freedom…. Society consents to be ruled undemocratically within defined areas by certain enduring principles believed to be stated in, and placed beyond the reach of majorities by, the Constitution.”
In practice, however, conservative ideology has latched onto the idea that the use of judicial review is “undemocratic” and “activist”; and will almost always constitute inappropriate “legislating from the bench.” What this argument ignores, of course, is that the whole point of the Constitution’s scheme of majoritarian government in the first place is to protect liberty and equal justice. As explained by Madison, Jefferson and Hamilton, the true original intent of the framers was that constitutionally-protected liberty and equal justice are not to be sacrificed to majority will.
When the Court fails to properly exercise its power of judicial review, liberty and equal justice suffer, because there is simply no other institution left to protect individual and minority rights. During World War I, for example, the Court upheld vast legislative prohibitions on speech; and during World War II it refused to curb executive forced-relocation and internment of thousands of innocent Japanese-Americans. America would look quite different today if the Court – largely under the leadership of Chief Justice Earl Warren, whose strong support of judicial review prompted President Dwight Eisenhower to grumble that his 1953 appointment of Warren to the Court was “the biggest damn-fool mistake I ever made” - had not eventually returned to checking the unconstitutional excesses of the democratically-elected executive and legislative branches.
As for the other part of the progressive liberty equation, how are we to understand how progressive government may proceed in acting for the common good? The first thing to understand is that, as compared to non-negotiable liberty, the “progressive” part of progressive liberty IS negotiable. In a democratic republic, it is the will of the people what sort of society they will have. So long as the government is not infringing on individual freedom, it can set widely varying policy - anything from a minimalist caretaker state to a more progressive social welfare model of the sort seen in Western Europe (or indeed, something more different still than either of these).
An energetic position, one that a progressive libertarian would favor, suggests that it is the government's duty to enact humane policy that looks out for people who can't help themselves, and that provides equal opportunity to all. Among other things, this means that government should guarantee that every man, woman, and child have access to basic healthcare. (Incidentally, the framers appeared to be “progressives” of a sort themselves, in that they advocated an energetic government. “Energy in the [government] is a leading character in the definition of good government,” Hamilton wrote in the Federalist 70. Madison agreed. “Energy in government,” he said in No. 37, “is essential to that security against external and internal danger, and to that prompt and salutary execution of the laws, which enter into the very definition of good government.”)
Does this mean that the Constitution mandates such government involvement?In a word: No. The Constitution sets up the republican form of the government and imposes strict limits on governmental infringements of individual liberty; but it leaves the details of social and economic policy to be worked out by the people through the democratic process. Whether the people prefer a Progressive Society, a Minimalist Society, or some other sort of Society, they control their destiny by voting for representatives who will legislate to that end. That's republican democracy: accountable majorities enacting policy; and if the majorities don't adequately reflect the people's wishes, others are elected who will. Then if at any time the democratically-accountable majority legislates in ways that inappropriately infringe individual liberty, the Constitution (as enforced by the Court) steps in. That's what liberty is about - limited government constrained by a Constitution that protects, above all else, individual freedom.
. . .
Now that we have a definition for progressive liberty, let’s look closer at the title of this paper, “Reconciling Liberty and Progressive Government.” Specifically, how are we to know the threshold beyond which a progressive, energetic government may not go, lest it infringe upon constitutionally-protected liberty?
An excellent place to start (and perhaps end) is with the "harm principle" enunciated by J.S. Mill in his 1859 classic, On Liberty:
"[There is but] one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, … that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others…. The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign."
Putting this into practical terms that government policymakers can apply, we might “think of the harm principle as operating in two steps,” Professor Ian Shapiro suggests. “When evaluating a particular action or policy, the first step involves deciding whether the action causes, or has the potential to cause, harm to others. If the answer is no, then the action is in the self-regarding realm and the government would be unjustified in interfering. Indeed, in that case the government has a duty to protect the individual’s freedom of action against interference from others as well. [The second step occurs] if, however, the answer to the initial query is yes, [in which case] different considerations arise. We are then in a world in which harm is being committed willy-nilly, and the question is: What, if anything, should the government do about it?,” and it is up to the democratic process to work that out.
In other words, society may legislate – whether progressively or not – either when the legislation (a) simply does not affect individual liberty, and/or (b) when a person’s conduct in exercising individual liberty prejudicially affects, or harms, the interests of others. (Incidentally, some, such as Randy Barnett, would define this latter situation as not involving “liberty” at all, but rather as “license” (which is not protected by the Constitution); on the reasoning that liberty, by definition, cannot harm others). In either case it is open to discussion through the democratic process whether the common good will be promoted. So conceived, the society may strike a balance between liberty and progressive government.
It is important to re-emphasize Shapiro’s conclusion, however (perhaps to the point of tedium), that according to the Harm Principle, “short of the point at which a person's conduct affects the interests of no persons besides himself, there is no room for [memorializing into law any such policy discussion.]” Individual liberty prevails in such cases, not to be touched by government.
This last point is crucial, in light of government's unceasing, inexorable, and perhaps-inevitable tendency to interfere inappropriately in individual conduct. Alexis de Tocqueville presciently identified the danger of an overactive government in his 1830 masterpiece, Democracy in America, stating: “[In a maturing democracy,] a wholly new species of oppression will arise. Among citizens equal and alike, the supreme power, the democratic government, acting in response to the will of the majority, will create a society with a network of small complicated rules, minute and uniform, that none can escape. Ultimately, then, the citizens of a democratic country will be reduced to nothing better than a flock of timid and industrious animals, of which the government is the shepherd.” To some in America today, this scenario sounds uncomfortably familiar.
Once again, under our constitutional regime it is the role of the judiciary to prevent this sort of creeping tyranny from occurring. One difficulty, though, is that ever since 1937 the Supreme Court has applied a disproportionately deferential standard of review to government action - to the detriment of individual liberty. (This occurred largely as a backlash to the Supreme Court overstepping its bounds during the mid-1930s when it aggressively struck down FDR’s New Deal legislation. Throughout the rest of the 20th and into the 21st century, the Court has swung too far in the other direction by not going far enough in requiring government (particularly state and local government) to justify its actions that may potentially affect liberty interests.) A more deferential-to-liberty standard of judicial review is needed, perhaps modeled on the Court’s existing First Amendment “reasonable time, place and manner” doctrine, as I suggest in a 2007 Louisiana Law Review piece. This approach, already championed on a narrow basis by the Third Circuit Federal Court of Appeals in Lutz v. York in 1990, more accurately honors the Constitution’s core Liberty-first ideals, while also recognizing the proper constitutional role of government in maintaining law and order.
In conclusion, government is liberty’s servant in America. Government – and democracy itself - exists primarily to protect liberty, with the Constitution serving as the bulwark against inevitable government attempts toward overreaching. The framers understood that men are not angels and that power has the overwhelming tendency to corrupt, so they constructed a limited government of separated powers with the ultimate power reserved to the people to operate within their own self-imposed constitutional constraints.
That said, to the extent government action does not implicate liberty, the details of social and economic policy are to be worked out by the people through the democratic process. One can be a staunch supporter of liberty on one hand; while working actively through the democratic process to enact progressive, energetic policy. That, in essence, is progressive liberty.
Saturday, March 14, 2009
Ginsburg: Opening Soon on Supreme Court; Qualities of the Next Justice
With Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s veiled hint yesterday of an impending vacancy on the U.S. Supreme Court, speculation about the necessary qualities of the next Justice will now begin in earnest.
By far the most important criterion for any new Justice is a judicial philosophy that embraces a healthy respect for the vital role played by judicial review in guaranteeing liberty and equal justice for all. (Gender will also be a key criterion if the vacancy is created by the retirement of Justice Ginsburg herself - it is unimaginable that the twenty-first century Supreme Court would not count at least one woman among its members.)
Judicial review, the Court’s power to correct the unconstitutional actions of the legislative and executive branches, is precisely how the framers originally envisioned the Court’s role in the constitutional design.
James Madison, for example, arguing in support of passage of the Bill of Rights before the First Congress, said, “independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the legislative or executive.” Addressing a French correspondent, Thomas Jefferson wrote, “the laws of the land, administered by upright judges, … would protect you from any exercise of power unauthorized by the Constitution of the United States.” And in Federalist 78 Alexander Hamilton commented that “the interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts…. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable difference between [the Constitution and a legislative act]…, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.”
In principle, judges and scholars from across the political spectrum agree on these basics. Conservative icon Robert Bork, for example, has written that “there are some things a majority should not do to us no matter how democratically it decides to do them. These are areas properly left to individual freedom…. Society consents to be ruled undemocratically within defined areas by certain enduring principles believed to be stated in, and placed beyond the reach of majorities by, the Constitution.”
In practice, however, conservative ideology has latched onto the idea that the use of "undemocratic" judicial review is “activist” and will almost always constitute inappropriate “legislating from the bench.” (This position is consistently held by a bare minority (four) of the current Supreme Court Justices, which explains the critical importance of the next Justice’s views on the matter.) What this argument ignores, of course, is that the whole point of the Constitution’s scheme of majoritarian government is to protect liberty and equal justice. As amply explained by Madison, Jefferson and Hamilton, the true original intent of the framers was that constitutionally-protected liberty and equal justice are not to be sacrificed to majority will.
When the Court fails to properly exercise its power of judicial review, liberty and equal justice suffer, because there is simply no other institution left to protect individual and minority rights. During World War I, for example, the Court upheld vast legislative prohibitions on speech; and during World War II it refused to curb executive forced-relocation and internment of thousands of innocent Japanese-Americans. America would look quite different today if the Court – largely under the leadership of Chief Justice Earl Warren, whose strong support of judicial review prompted President Dwight Eisenhower to grumble that his 1953 appointment of Warren to the Court was “the biggest damn-fool mistake I ever made” - had not eventually returned to checking the unconstitutional excesses of the democratically-elected executive and legislative branches.
So as President Obama looks at candidates for a Supreme Court vacancy, he should insist on a person whose judicial philosophy includes a strong understanding of the important role judicial review has played throughout American history in vindicating individual rights and ensuring equal justice for all. The U.S. Supreme Court must not shrink from fulfilling its crucial - yes, active - original constitutional role of critically reviewing the actions of the executive and legislative branches and striking them down where necessary.
By far the most important criterion for any new Justice is a judicial philosophy that embraces a healthy respect for the vital role played by judicial review in guaranteeing liberty and equal justice for all. (Gender will also be a key criterion if the vacancy is created by the retirement of Justice Ginsburg herself - it is unimaginable that the twenty-first century Supreme Court would not count at least one woman among its members.)
Judicial review, the Court’s power to correct the unconstitutional actions of the legislative and executive branches, is precisely how the framers originally envisioned the Court’s role in the constitutional design.
James Madison, for example, arguing in support of passage of the Bill of Rights before the First Congress, said, “independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the legislative or executive.” Addressing a French correspondent, Thomas Jefferson wrote, “the laws of the land, administered by upright judges, … would protect you from any exercise of power unauthorized by the Constitution of the United States.” And in Federalist 78 Alexander Hamilton commented that “the interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts…. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable difference between [the Constitution and a legislative act]…, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.”
In principle, judges and scholars from across the political spectrum agree on these basics. Conservative icon Robert Bork, for example, has written that “there are some things a majority should not do to us no matter how democratically it decides to do them. These are areas properly left to individual freedom…. Society consents to be ruled undemocratically within defined areas by certain enduring principles believed to be stated in, and placed beyond the reach of majorities by, the Constitution.”
In practice, however, conservative ideology has latched onto the idea that the use of "undemocratic" judicial review is “activist” and will almost always constitute inappropriate “legislating from the bench.” (This position is consistently held by a bare minority (four) of the current Supreme Court Justices, which explains the critical importance of the next Justice’s views on the matter.) What this argument ignores, of course, is that the whole point of the Constitution’s scheme of majoritarian government is to protect liberty and equal justice. As amply explained by Madison, Jefferson and Hamilton, the true original intent of the framers was that constitutionally-protected liberty and equal justice are not to be sacrificed to majority will.
When the Court fails to properly exercise its power of judicial review, liberty and equal justice suffer, because there is simply no other institution left to protect individual and minority rights. During World War I, for example, the Court upheld vast legislative prohibitions on speech; and during World War II it refused to curb executive forced-relocation and internment of thousands of innocent Japanese-Americans. America would look quite different today if the Court – largely under the leadership of Chief Justice Earl Warren, whose strong support of judicial review prompted President Dwight Eisenhower to grumble that his 1953 appointment of Warren to the Court was “the biggest damn-fool mistake I ever made” - had not eventually returned to checking the unconstitutional excesses of the democratically-elected executive and legislative branches.
So as President Obama looks at candidates for a Supreme Court vacancy, he should insist on a person whose judicial philosophy includes a strong understanding of the important role judicial review has played throughout American history in vindicating individual rights and ensuring equal justice for all. The U.S. Supreme Court must not shrink from fulfilling its crucial - yes, active - original constitutional role of critically reviewing the actions of the executive and legislative branches and striking them down where necessary.
Friday, June 13, 2008
Supreme Court's Habeas Case - "Three Strikes and You're Out" for Bush
Yesterday, for the third time in four years, the Supreme Court rebuffed the Bush Administration's handling of detainees at Guantanamo Bay (a strategy which has amounted, basically, to denying detainees the normal protections guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution), stating, "The laws and Constitution are designed to survive, and remain in force, in extraordinary times."
The majority opinion in this case, Boumediene v. Bush, written by Anthony Kennedy, asserts, "Security subsists, [in addition to use of a 'sophisticated intelligence apparatus and the ability of our armed forces to act and to interdict'], in fidelity to freedom's first principles. Chief among these are freedom from arbitrary and unlawful restraint and the personal liberty that is secured by adherence to the separation of powers. It is from these principles that the judicial authority to consider petitions for habeas corpus relief [ie, a person's right to go to federal court to demand that the government either justify their detention or set them free] derives.
"Our opinion does not undermine the Executive's powers as commander in chief. On the contrary, the exercise of those powers is vindicated, not eroded, when confirmed by the Judicial Branch.
"Within the Constitution's separation-of-powers structure, few exercises of judicial power are as legitimate or as necessary as the responsibility to hear challenges to the authority of the Executive to imprison a person.
"Some of these petitioners have been in custody for six years with no definitive judicial determination as to the legality of their detention. Their access to the writ [of habeas corpus] is a necessity to determine the lawfulness of their status, even if, in the end, they do not obtain the relief they seek...." (emphasis mine).
Good stuff - kudos to the Court, and Long Live the Constitution and the principles of Freedom and Liberty for which it stands.
The scary thing about the case, though, is that it was decided just 5-4. Who are these people who would dissent from the right of people to ask why the government is detaining them - some for as long as six years without due process?? It's one thing when justices disagree on more mundane things, but when we're talking about the most fundamental principles underpinning our entire Nation - i.e., Freedom, Liberty, Due Process of Law – one really has to wonder.
All the more reason it’s imperative that Barack Obama is elected president – with such a razor-thin margin on the Supreme Court, America cannot afford a president who would nominate another justice like those in the dissent here (Scalia, Roberts, Alito, Thomas). This Court already contains, by one measure published in U.S. News, four of the five most conservative justices to sit on the Supreme Court since 1937.
With a President John McCain, we are in danger of losing the most cherished principles of Liberty that we’ve held dear since the Nation’s founding (McCain “expressed concern” about the Court’s opinion in Boumediene; and has stated in the past he would use John Roberts and Joseph Alito as models were he to nominate a Justice.)
By contrast, a President Barack Obama would try to nominate a Justice who supports the majority opinion. Responding to yesterday’s decision, Obama stated, “[The decision is] a rejection of the Bush administration’s attempt to create a legal black hole at Guantanamo…. This is an important step toward reestablishing our credibility as a nation committed to the rule of law, and rejecting a false choice between fighting terrorism and respecting habeas corpus. Our courts have employed habeas corpus with rigor and fairness for more than two centuries, and we must continue to do so as we defend the freedom that violent extremists seek to destroy.”
One final note: Justice Antonin Scalia's hypocricy was exposed yet again in his dissent, with his claim that the decision was based not on principle, "but rather an inflated notion of judicial supremacy." Next time Scalia writes or signs on again to an opinion striking down, for example, a state law of the sort passed by California in Raich v. California (where the California legislature had acted well within its authority in giving state citizens even greater liberty than the minimum required in the federal Constitution when they passed a law allowing medical use of marijuana), one must demand of him, "What about 'inflated notions of judicial supremacy' now??"
Contrary to the claims in Scalia's cramped sophistry, the framers’ true vision was of an expansive individual Liberty vis-à-vis a controlling Government.
The majority opinion in this case, Boumediene v. Bush, written by Anthony Kennedy, asserts, "Security subsists, [in addition to use of a 'sophisticated intelligence apparatus and the ability of our armed forces to act and to interdict'], in fidelity to freedom's first principles. Chief among these are freedom from arbitrary and unlawful restraint and the personal liberty that is secured by adherence to the separation of powers. It is from these principles that the judicial authority to consider petitions for habeas corpus relief [ie, a person's right to go to federal court to demand that the government either justify their detention or set them free] derives.
"Our opinion does not undermine the Executive's powers as commander in chief. On the contrary, the exercise of those powers is vindicated, not eroded, when confirmed by the Judicial Branch.
"Within the Constitution's separation-of-powers structure, few exercises of judicial power are as legitimate or as necessary as the responsibility to hear challenges to the authority of the Executive to imprison a person.
"Some of these petitioners have been in custody for six years with no definitive judicial determination as to the legality of their detention. Their access to the writ [of habeas corpus] is a necessity to determine the lawfulness of their status, even if, in the end, they do not obtain the relief they seek...." (emphasis mine).
Good stuff - kudos to the Court, and Long Live the Constitution and the principles of Freedom and Liberty for which it stands.
The scary thing about the case, though, is that it was decided just 5-4. Who are these people who would dissent from the right of people to ask why the government is detaining them - some for as long as six years without due process?? It's one thing when justices disagree on more mundane things, but when we're talking about the most fundamental principles underpinning our entire Nation - i.e., Freedom, Liberty, Due Process of Law – one really has to wonder.
All the more reason it’s imperative that Barack Obama is elected president – with such a razor-thin margin on the Supreme Court, America cannot afford a president who would nominate another justice like those in the dissent here (Scalia, Roberts, Alito, Thomas). This Court already contains, by one measure published in U.S. News, four of the five most conservative justices to sit on the Supreme Court since 1937.
With a President John McCain, we are in danger of losing the most cherished principles of Liberty that we’ve held dear since the Nation’s founding (McCain “expressed concern” about the Court’s opinion in Boumediene; and has stated in the past he would use John Roberts and Joseph Alito as models were he to nominate a Justice.)
By contrast, a President Barack Obama would try to nominate a Justice who supports the majority opinion. Responding to yesterday’s decision, Obama stated, “[The decision is] a rejection of the Bush administration’s attempt to create a legal black hole at Guantanamo…. This is an important step toward reestablishing our credibility as a nation committed to the rule of law, and rejecting a false choice between fighting terrorism and respecting habeas corpus. Our courts have employed habeas corpus with rigor and fairness for more than two centuries, and we must continue to do so as we defend the freedom that violent extremists seek to destroy.”
One final note: Justice Antonin Scalia's hypocricy was exposed yet again in his dissent, with his claim that the decision was based not on principle, "but rather an inflated notion of judicial supremacy." Next time Scalia writes or signs on again to an opinion striking down, for example, a state law of the sort passed by California in Raich v. California (where the California legislature had acted well within its authority in giving state citizens even greater liberty than the minimum required in the federal Constitution when they passed a law allowing medical use of marijuana), one must demand of him, "What about 'inflated notions of judicial supremacy' now??"
Contrary to the claims in Scalia's cramped sophistry, the framers’ true vision was of an expansive individual Liberty vis-à-vis a controlling Government.
Sunday, June 1, 2008
The Debaters - "An Unjust Law Is No Law At All"
Last night I watched Denzel Washington's and Forrest Whitaker's "The Debaters," the true story about the tiny all-Black Wiley College (Texas) debate team that went undefeated for ten years (~1935-45) against the likes of Harvard, just out on DVD - highly recommended.
One St. Augustine maxim, quoted in a debate scene by one of the leads in support of Civil Disobedience, stands out: "An Unjust Law is No Law At All."
Majorities sometimes pass oppressive laws; and it is the right, or even the duty, of fairminded people to resist, whether (to paraphrase the closing lines in the movie's debate argument) "by violence, or by civil disobedience. You should pray that I choose the latter."
. . . . .
This line of thought speaks to the proper role for courts in the constitutional system: it is the courts' judicial role, through judicial review, to protect minority and individual interests from oppressive impulses of the majority.
One St. Augustine maxim, quoted in a debate scene by one of the leads in support of Civil Disobedience, stands out: "An Unjust Law is No Law At All."
Majorities sometimes pass oppressive laws; and it is the right, or even the duty, of fairminded people to resist, whether (to paraphrase the closing lines in the movie's debate argument) "by violence, or by civil disobedience. You should pray that I choose the latter."
. . . . .
This line of thought speaks to the proper role for courts in the constitutional system: it is the courts' judicial role, through judicial review, to protect minority and individual interests from oppressive impulses of the majority.
Labels:
Freedom,
judicial review,
Liberty,
social justice
Wednesday, July 25, 2007
Separation of Powers Showdown
The President's position that his aides are absolutely immune from testifying before Congress, despite congressional subpoenas for information on the abrupt firings of federal prosecutors, sets up a separation-of-powers showdown that will be resolved ultimately by the Supreme Court - which these days is an increasingly scary proposition.
As reported by MSNBC, "the White House has said that Chief of Staff Josh Bolten and former legal counselor Harriet Miers, among other top advisers to President Bush, are absolutely immune from subpoenas because their documents and testimony are protected by executive privilege." In response, House Democrats today are preparing contempt of Congress citations against Bolten and Miers.
This is just the latest in George W. Bush's assault on the Constitution. The Supreme Court, IF it adheres to precedent on this issue, will hold that executive privilege does not extend to allow aides to avoid responding to congressional subpoena. This would be the correct decision, in that it recognizes the proper separation of powers among the executive and legislative branches envisioned by the framers of the Constitution.
That's a big "if," though, since the Roberts Court has demonstrated in its recently-completed 2006-07 term that it is perfectly willing to discard precedent when it might have more cautiously decided the cases on other grounds. And we're perilously close - if we're not there already - to having a majority of the Court ratify the President's extreme views of Executive power. Even a case that seemed as open-and-shut as the 2006 Hamdan case, holding that the executive lacked the power to unilaterally limit the due process rights of enemy combatants imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay, was only 5-3 (actually, 5-4, since Chief Justice Roberts recused himself, having decided the case below in favor of the President while on the DC Federal Court of Appeals).
I've said it before, but this is yet another illustration of the notion that our constitutional regime has an Achilles Heel in the vast power of the Supreme Court - i.e., if we ever get five justices (enough for a majority) who consistently vote in ways that systematically undermine the text and spirit of the Constitution, there's little We the People can do to reverse the decisions of these appointed-for-life Justices. Oh, technically we can amend the Constitution or argue that Congress will impeach the Justices, but both of these alternatives are so remote as to be virtually non-existent.
Stay tuned for the future of our constitutional democracy.
As reported by MSNBC, "the White House has said that Chief of Staff Josh Bolten and former legal counselor Harriet Miers, among other top advisers to President Bush, are absolutely immune from subpoenas because their documents and testimony are protected by executive privilege." In response, House Democrats today are preparing contempt of Congress citations against Bolten and Miers.
This is just the latest in George W. Bush's assault on the Constitution. The Supreme Court, IF it adheres to precedent on this issue, will hold that executive privilege does not extend to allow aides to avoid responding to congressional subpoena. This would be the correct decision, in that it recognizes the proper separation of powers among the executive and legislative branches envisioned by the framers of the Constitution.
That's a big "if," though, since the Roberts Court has demonstrated in its recently-completed 2006-07 term that it is perfectly willing to discard precedent when it might have more cautiously decided the cases on other grounds. And we're perilously close - if we're not there already - to having a majority of the Court ratify the President's extreme views of Executive power. Even a case that seemed as open-and-shut as the 2006 Hamdan case, holding that the executive lacked the power to unilaterally limit the due process rights of enemy combatants imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay, was only 5-3 (actually, 5-4, since Chief Justice Roberts recused himself, having decided the case below in favor of the President while on the DC Federal Court of Appeals).
I've said it before, but this is yet another illustration of the notion that our constitutional regime has an Achilles Heel in the vast power of the Supreme Court - i.e., if we ever get five justices (enough for a majority) who consistently vote in ways that systematically undermine the text and spirit of the Constitution, there's little We the People can do to reverse the decisions of these appointed-for-life Justices. Oh, technically we can amend the Constitution or argue that Congress will impeach the Justices, but both of these alternatives are so remote as to be virtually non-existent.
Stay tuned for the future of our constitutional democracy.
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